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Introduction
Numerous researchers have analyzed the causes for distress of financial agents during the recent financial crisis starting in 2007. Through both theoretical and empirical analyses, they came up with a variety of reasons. These include panics of bank customers and major investors, shocks to money sup- The paper is structured as follows. First, I discuss previous literature in the area. In Section 3 I introduce the data while in Section 4 I present the empirical analysis. In Section 5 I discuss the results, while Section 6 concludes the paper and suggests topics for future research.
Literature Review
This paper draws on literature from two distinct research areas: (i) microand macroeconomic research on the existence of financial crises and (ii) investigations into the foundations of FI. 3 
Financial Crises
The first field of research pertains to the origins and persistence of financial crises, or more particularly, the investigation of causes for financial distress of single agents providing any kind of financial services. In their seminal paper, Allen and Gale (2000) investigate possible contagion and bubbles in financial networks. They build a model of contagion with perfectly competitive banking and show that a first-best allocation of risk-sharing is possible, but fragility still persists. Subsequently, Upper and Worms (2004) confirm Allen and Gale's (2000) model by empirically evaluating the risk of contagion and credit risk in the German interbank lending market. 4 Their analysis provides two results: First, credit risk may trigger a domino effect in that there exists considerable scope for contagion even with safety mechanisms.
Second, more concentrated structures can lower the threshold for contagion. 5 Furthermore, Allen and Gale (2004) analyze the relation between competition and financial stability. Here, they find a negative trade-off between both while considering a variety of different settings such as general equi- 3 General surveys about research on financial agents with particular focus on asymmetries of information and security design are given by Allen and Winton (1995) and Duffie and Rahie (1995) . 4 They use balance sheet data of German banks to estimate bilateral credit relationships. 5 Many more papers can be found which empirically analyze the causes for financial crises both at a micro-and macro-level. Since I want to focus on the distinct relationship between FI and financial health, an extended overview on that area of literature would be beyond the scope of this paper.
librium models, agency models, Schumpeterian competition and contagion.
In a three-period model with risky and standard assets as well as timing incongruity, they show that greater competition is good for efficiency, but bad for financial stability. Additionally, Allen et al. (2009) provide a thorough review on financial crises. They find that most financial crises arise from panics, business cycle fluctuations or contagion, and derive from this evidence a common sequence of events. 6 
Financial Innovations
A second strand of literature looks at the origins and existence of financial innovations. 7 The seminal definition of FI is given by Tufano (2003) : It is the creation of financial instruments (both product and process) by invention or diffusion of products, services or ideas. He states that FI exists because of the incompleteness of markets, for managing risk, for pooling of funds and because of regulation. White (2004, 2009 ) review the technological changes and innovations in commercial banking over the last 25 years. They employ the same definition of FI as Tufano (2003) and argue that FI reduce costs and risks, pool funds and provide a tool to serve demands of investors. In addition, they survey the literature to illustrate innovation patterns over the investigated period.
From a theoretical perspective, numerous papers provide arguments for the existence of innovations in financial markets. Most recently, Michalopoulos 6 With surging money supply, asset prices and credit volumes increase which inevitably lead to a price bubble bound to burst. A banking crisis is then followed by an exchange-rate crisis and a substantial drop in real output. Brunnermeier (2009) presents an overview on the development of the recent financial crisis and uses micro-and macro-level data to suggest reasonable policy interventions. Empirical assessments of innovations in financial markets have started with research in the 1980s and 1990s. 8 In his early contribution, Tufano (1989) argues that FI provide first-mover advantages. He assesses the dynamics of innovations and competition by analyzing data on 58 publicly offered FI in the years 1974 to 1987 which raised USD 280 billion and providing crosssectional regressions of the underwriting spread on firm characteristics. 9 He finds that 20% of new securities being issued in 1987 have not been in existence in 1974 and that new product ideas diffuse rapidly across competitors so that banks do not enjoy monopoly pricing with innovations, but rather capture a larger market share with lower prices than their imitators. Lerner (2002) looks at financial patents during the period 1971 to 2000 and analyzes the impact of the State Street decision 10 on the degree of inno-8 See e.g. Miller (1986 Miller ( , 1992 , Merton (1992) , White (2004, 2009 paper is the first quantitative assessment of the innovation-fragility view at the agent level. I employ a data set by Lerner (2006) and augment it with performance and stability measures so that I can study the effect of firm-level variation in FI on the stability of financial agents. Although I focus here on the USA, this firm-level analysis can offer insights into the incentives to innovate and dynamics in a competitive financial system.
Incentives to Innovate and Financial Crises

Data
The data set measures financial innovations in the USA from 1990 until 2002 via a unique counting mechanism. 12 Lerner (2006) ability, firm characteristics and patenting. 13 The sample consists of firms with either at least one innovation observed by the measure during the time period or being active in the SIC codes 60 through 64 and 67. 14 The data set consists of four different groups of variables: 15 First, I use firm characteristics to control for firm-specific effects. In accordance with Lerner (2006) , I use the logarithm of total assets to measure firm size. Profitability (Opprof ) is defined as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBIT DA) divided by revenues, and leverage is defined as the ratio of the book value of a firm's long-term debt to total capitalization. Further control variables include firm age, cash equivalents, employees, shareholders' equity, long-term debt, common market value and revenues. 12 The data were kindly provided by Josh Lerner, Harvard Business School. 13 See also Lerner (2002) for his aforementioned earlier work on financial patents. 14 These SIC codes include firms operating in the financial services business such as insurance, banking, financial advisory and so on except for real estate. 15 For complete descriptions of the variables used here, see Table A1 in the Appendix.
Second, the data set includes performance measures like EBITDA, net income, retained earnings as well as return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) which are used to derive the stability measures and provide information about the competitive nature.
Third, I measure stability of financial institutions with the Z-score. The Zscore is a measure of bank solvency and corresponds to (ROA+CAR)/σ(ROA).
It "indicates the number of standard deviations that a bank's rate of return on assets can fall in a single period before it becomes insolvent. A higher Z-score signals a lower probability of bank insolvency" (Beck et al. 2012 ). 16 For robustness checks, I later also use other stability measures such as the capital-asset ratio (CAR), standard deviations of returns, and the Sharpe ratio which is defined as ROE/σ(ROE). Like any other measure of FI, the count measure used here also has its limitations. It necessarily excludes private firms not listed in Compustat. Furthermore, the time period is rather limited and the methodology to source the counts of innovations from the articles is based on stylized facts of FI.
Also, problems in assessing FI exist due to the rarity of R&D spending by financial institutions, the infrequency of financial patents and the intransparency of FI by private firms as discussed by Tufano (2003) , White (2004, 2009 ) and Lerner and Tufano (2011) . Therefore, the count measure introduced by Lerner (2006) and applied here to analyze financial fragility is a promising first start to assess empirically the connection between financial innovations and instability of financial agents.
Empirical Analysis
This section explores the relationship between FI and financial agents' fragility empirically. I first provide a description of the data and then present the empirical model specification. Table 1 provides an overview of the summary statistics of the variables. It shows that there exists great heterogeneity among firms in terms of size and profitability. Because I include all firms active in financial services, leverage ratios are comparably low. Stability measures are constructed from the firm characteristics to capture a firm's insolvency risk and activity risk. Higher numbers for the Sharpe ratio and the Z-score reflect less fragility. Moreover, the count data on FI includes a lot of zeros as indicated by the low means. 17 Generally, variances of the variables are quite large. For most variables, mean values are larger than the median because there are a lot of firms in the sample whose observations depict values close to zero for the variables used here.
Descriptive Statistics and Properties
Observations are evenly distributed over the time period and firm characteristics exhibit a high degree of persistence. About 11% of firms in the sample have observations for the entire time period. About 26% of firms have 8 or more consecutive observations. On average, the data set has 9 observations per firm. 17 In total, the data set includes only 588 incidences of financial innovation. 18 See Table A2 in the Appendix. 19 I use augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests to analyze cointegration. If Z-scores were really I(1), then their time series would be a random walk with drift. In fact, the data is trend stationary and I use a time trend in my regression models to account for that. 20 Their work shows that the Z-score is a feasible indicator to measure financial stability of firms and is commonly used in the literature.
Empirical Strategy
where indices i, t stand respectively for firm and time, Z is the Z-score per firm and period. 21 Including lagged dependent variables allows me to account for the persistence of firm characteristics which also reflect in the Zscores by construction and the general persistence over time. X is the vector of firm characteristics for which data are available while Y is the vector of different financial innovation indicators. To account for firm heterogeneity, I
use ratios of balance sheet items relative to asset size for the control variables and employ the logarithm of all independent variables that are not ratios.
The regression model also includes α i and δ t to account for omitted firmspecific and time fixed effects, respectively. The Newey-West-type robust error term is clustered at firm-level and allowed to be heteroskedastic, autocorrelated and spatially correlated.
Results
In this section, I discuss the main results and perform a number of robustness checks. I also extend the model to further investigate the innovation-fragility view in more detail. Hence, more technology spillovers should theoretically be observed in the pre-1998 period because of the legal uncertainty prior to the CAFC deci- Overall, results show that indeed there exists a significant positive relation between FI and fragility (negative relation between FI and Z-scores) albeit small, but patenting seems to be no factor. The size of the coefficients however corresponds to the correlations from the univariate analyses in Section 4.1. Surprisingly, the agglomeration effect as measured in FI by others is very weak.
Baseline Model
22 I already mentioned this in the Literature Review (Section 2) and it is discussed in Lerner (2002).
Robustness
I check the robustness of my results. Foremost, the results in Table 2 given the small coefficient for lagged Z-scores from Table 2 , I further pursue the Driscoll-Kraay (1998) estimator with fixed effects and lagged dependent variables in my analysis.
Extensions
I extend the baseline model with a couple features. First, I want to explore the relationship between innovation and fragility across firms with different characteristics. Thus, I generate interaction terms of the FI measures estimators are consistent, but they assume that there exists no autocorrelation in the error terms, that panel-level effects are uncorrelated with the first differences and that good instruments are available. with assets, profitability and leverage. 26 Table 3 Across all models, the positive (negative) relation between innovation and fragility (stability) prevails, while the size of the coefficients differs across specifications.
Second, I investigate the robustness of my results from Section 3.4 against modifications of innovation measures as depicted in Table 4 . Column 1 provides the regression results with the Driscoll-Kraay (1998) estimator from Table 2 . Subsequently, column 2 uses a weighting mechanism to account for sole or collaborative inventions, column 3 uses only highly innovative activities as classified by a three-part scheme introduced by Lerner (2006) , column 4 provides a combination of 2 and 3 and finally, column 5 introduces R&D expenditures as a further control. 27 Results are confirmed. The positive relation between innovation and fragility is persistent while patenting has no effect. Table A1 in the Appendix for definitions of the variables. Count data on innovations comes from the Wall Street Journal, the Factiva database or the US Patent and Trademark Office, collected by Lerner (2006) . All financial data is in million 2002 US Dollars and comes from Compustat. All columns incorporate the baseline model from column 4 of Table 2 . Column 1 includes interaction terms between firm size and FI measures. Column 2 includes interaction terms between profitability and FI measures. Column 3 includes interaction terms between leverage ratio and FI measures. Finally, column 4 includes all interaction terms. In all regressions, I include firm characteristics as controls, firm and year fixed effects, and a constant but suppress their coefficients in the tables. Control variables include firm age, cash equivalents, employees, retained earnings, shareholders' equity, preferred stock and long-term debt (all as ratios relative to assets or logarithms). DriscollKraay (1998) robust standard errors are clustered at firm-level and presented in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Table 2 . Column 2 includes a weighting mechanism to account for sole or collaborative inventions. Column 3 includes only highly innovative activities as classified by a three-part scheme introduced by Lerner (2006) . Column 4 is a combination of 2 and 3. It includes a weighting mechanism to account for sole or collaborative inventions of only highly innovative activities as classified by Lerner (2006) . Finally, column 5 includes R&D expenditures as a further control. In all regressions, I include firm characteristics as controls, firm and year fixed effects, and a constant but suppress their coefficients in the tables. Control variables include firm age, cash equivalents, employees, retained earnings, shareholders' equity, preferred stock and long-term debt (all as ratios relative to assets or logarithms). Driscoll-Kraay (1998) robust standard errors are clustered at firm-level and presented in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Third, I further explore the robustness of results by investigating the components of the Z-score and alternative measures for firm fragility in Table 5 . 
ln(1+Z-scoret) ln(1+ROAt) ln (1+ROEt) Table 2 . Column 2 and 3 measure the impact of FI on profitability where returns on assets and equity are the dependent variables, respectively. Column 4 measures the impact of FI on capitalization of forms. Here, the capital-asset ratio is the dependent variable. Column 5 and 6 measure the impact of FI on activity risk by including the standard deviations of the returns on assets and equity, respectively.
For these two regressions coefficients are scaled by 1,000. Finally, column 7 includes the Sharpe Ratio as dependent variable as another stability measure. In all regressions, I include firm characteristics as controls, firm and year fixed effects, and a constant but suppress their coefficients in the tables. Control variables include firm age, cash equivalents, employees, retained earnings, shareholders' equity, preferred stock and long-term debt (all as ratios relative to assets or logarithms). Driscoll-Kraay (1998) robust standard errors are clustered at firm-level and presented in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Table A1 Table 7 provides the results which suggest that more innovative firms face higher profitability declines during distress. The significantly negative sign on γ is consistent with the innovation-fragility view and suggests that firms with higher FI suffered more in a crisis. Lerner (2006) . FI measures are averaged over the period 1990 to 1999. All financial data is in million 2002 US Dollars and comes from Compustat. In column 1, I use the change in ROA as dependent variable, in column 2, I use the change in ROE as dependent variable, and finally, in column 3, I use the change in operational profitability as dependent variable. In all regressions, I include firm characteristics as controls and a constant but suppress their coefficients in the tables. Control variables include firm age, cash equivalents, employees, retained earnings, shareholders' equity, preferred stock and long-term debt (all as ratios relative to assets or logarithms). Robust standard errors are clustered at firm-level and presented in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Conclusion
In this paper, I evaluate the relationship between financial innovations and the fragility of financial institutions. Theoretical literature provides strong evidence for why financial crises exist and why firms engage in producing financial innovations. A recent strand of research tries to combine both areas and analyzes the impact of innovative activity of financial agents in a competitive framework. Particularly, this mostly theoretical literature links profit volatility to innovative activities and predicts a positive relationship.
That is, the degree of innovation negatively affects firm stability. Further research could include applying VAR models that take greater account for the persistence in firm characteristics and causality. Expanding the time dimension may make the analysis more robust while cross-country comparisons could provide policy recommendations. Additionally, insights into the dynamics of innovative activity could be deduced from a structural approach to modelling FI. 
